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Abstract 
The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the central EU policy instrument 
aimed at mitigating climate change. According to Coase (1960), the level of emissions for 
each firm in an emission trading, in equilibrium, does not depend on the assignment of 
property rights over the emissions but this could not be the case in a real-world system, with 
a lot of possible frictions, as transaction costs and behavioural anomalies. 
This paper exploits the asymmetry in the allocation mechanisms introduced from the 
third phase of the EU ETS to evaluate whether different allocation mechanisms are neutral 
in terms of emission abatement decisions. Results suggest a non-neutral role of the 
allocation mechanisms. 
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Quanto è neutrale il meccanismo di allocazione dei permessi in 
uno schema di cap-and-trade? Evidenza basata sull’EU ETS 
 
Sommario 
L’Emission Trading Scheme Europeo (EU ETS) è il principale politico dell’UE per la 
mitigazione del cambiamento climatico. Secondo Coase (1960), il livello di emissioni di 
ogni impresa appartenente a un emission trading, in equilibrio, non dipende 
dall’assegnazione dei diritti di proprietà riguardo al permesso a inquinare. Questa 
assunzione potrebbe fallire nel mondo reale a causa di possibili frizioni, costi di transazioni 
e anomalie comportamentali. 
Questo articolo sfrutta l’asimmetria nel meccanismo di allocazione dei permessi 
introdotta a partire dalla terza fase dell’EU ETS per valutare se diversi meccanismi di 
allocazione sono neutrali in termini di decisioni di abbattimento delle emissioni. I risultati 
indicano un ruolo non neutrale dei meccanismi di allocazione 
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Introduction 
 
Since the very beginning, the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) has attracted a lot of attention among scholars and policy makers, 
because it is the central EU policy instrument in order to mitigate climate 
change and to comply with the target agreed in the Kyoto protocol. The EU 
ETS represents the first attempt to develop a transboundary system of 
emissions trading and, therefore, it represents a prototype to other ETSs 
spreading around the world (see Borghesi et al, 2016). The attractiveness of 
a cap-and-trade scheme like the EU ETS is due to the fact that, under 
certain conditions, it allows to attain a certain environmental target 
exogenously defined in an efficient way as a homogeneous price for 
emission permits across all the participants to the scheme will induce the 
equalization of marginal abatement costs. 
According to the conventional wisdom (Palmer et al, 1995), by setting a 
price for carbon emissions the EU ETS adds a constraint to firms, thus 
reducing (at least from a static point of view) expected profits with respect 
to a no-policy scenario. Many recent papers (see Marin et al, 2017, for 
recent evidence on manufacturing firms in the EU, and Martin et al, 2015, 
for a comprehensive review) have looked at the potential impact of the EU 
ETS on the economic performance of treated firms, finding mixed evidence 
on a large variety of measures of economic performance (productivity, 
turnover, employment, etc). Carbon pricing, however, also induces 
investments in low carbon technologies aimed at reducing the cost of 
complying with the regulation. Calel and Dechezlepretre (2016) found a 
significant positive inducement effect of the EU ETS on the development 
of low-carbon technologies (measured with new patent applications) for EU 
ETS firms. According to Porter and van der Linde (1995), the impact of 
environmental regulation on innovation could partly (weak version of the 
Porter Hypothesis) or even more than compensate (strong version of the 
Porter Hypothesis) for the costs of compliance, leading to improved 
economic performance of regulated firms. 
The potentially harmful impacts on the competitiveness of European 
firms subject to the EU ETS coupled with the fact that the EU ETS was 
unilaterally introduced in Europe may induce firms to relocate their carbon-
intensive production activities in countries with less stringent regulations 
for mitigating climate change (carbon leakage effect, see Martin et al, 2014 
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and, for Italy, Borghesi et al, 2018).1 Carbon leakage has two negative 
implications for the country (or group of countries) that introduces a 
unilateral stringent climate mitigation policy. First, in case the strong 
version of the Porter Hypothesis does not hold, emissions are just partly or 
fully displaced towards other countries. As GHG emissions are global 
externalities (i.e. they contribute to global warming no matter where they 
are emitted), a simple displacement of carbon intensive activities 
undermines the environmental objective of the regulation. Second, the 
relocation of carbon-intensive industries has a negative impact on the 
wealth and jobs created within the country. For this reason, the European 
Commission has been particularly sensitive about the issue of carbon 
leakage. In the first two phases of the EU ETS, emissions permits were 
allocated for free (i.e. grandfathering) while starting from the third phase 
(2013-2020) an increasing share of permits will be sold in auctions 
(generating revenues for public budgets) just for those sectors that are not 
exposed to carbon leakage risks. 
According to the seminal paper by Coase (1960), the level of emissions 
of each firm in equilibrium does not depend on the assignment of property 
rights over the emissions. If we apply this statement to the case of the EU 
ETS that means that the same result in terms of the distribution of 
abatement choices should be attained independently on the choice of the 
allocation mechanism. Different allocation mechanisms would only 
generate a different distribution of net benefits across firms or between 
firms and the government. This nice theoretical result implies that cap-and-
trade schemes attain the equalization of marginal abatement costs across 
firms and thus a socially efficient distribution of the burden for climate 
policy. On the other hand, if for any reason the allocation mechanism is no 
longer neutral, a cap-and-trade scheme does not necessarily represent a 
first-best solution. 
In this paper we exploit the asymmetry in the allocation mechanisms 
introduced from the third phase of the EU ETS as a way to evaluate 
whether different allocation mechanisms are neutral in terms of emission 
abatement decisions. The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we 
 
1 There is an extensive literature on the so-called ‘Pollution Haven Effect’ that is aimed 
at evaluating (theoretically and empirically) the extent to which stringent environmental 
regulation in one country induce the displacement of pollution intensive activities towards 
unregulated countries (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 2005). Empirical analysis on this topic found 
mixed results, depending on the type of approach (micro vs macro estimates), the type of 
environmental regulation, the environmental pressures that is evaluated and the sample of 
regions and countries that are considered. 
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describe in detail the European Emission Trading Scheme. Section 3 
provides a theoretical discussion of the issues at stake, with a focus on the 
role played by carbon leakage considerations within the EU ETS and the 
possible reasons that may explain non-neutrality of the allocation 
mechanism. Section 4 provides an overview of recent trends in allocated 
and verified emissions for the EU ETS. Section 5 provides empirical 
evidence on whether verified emissions are independent on the allocation 
mechanism. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
1. The EU ETS 
 
The EU ETS was introduced by the Directive 2003/87/EC2 as the main 
initiative of the European climate change mitigation policy to reach the 
Kyoto targets and in order to be compliant with other current and future 
regional and international targets. In a few words, this is a cap-and-trade 
scheme put in place in order to keep CO2 emissions under control: in this 
scheme, emissions permits are allocated to the participants at the beginning 
of each period, either for free (also known as grandfathering) or auctioned. 
At the end of each period, all the participants are required not to have debt 
on emissions, that is they are required to return an amount of emissions 
permits at least corresponding to the actual amount of verified emissions. In 
the meantime, permits can be traded on a market, that is they can be 
transferred between participants at a price per ton of CO2 that, in 
equilibrium, should be equal to the marginal abatement cost, leading to 
efficient distribution of abatement across participants. Within the EU ETS, 
the penalty for non-complying (that is, a participant is not able to return a 
sufficient number of emissions permits at the end of the compliance period) 
was set to 40 euros per ton in the pilot phase (2005-2007) and to 100 euros 
per ton for the period 2008-2012. 
In this scheme, three main periods can be identified: the period 2005-
2007 represented a pilot phase. No banking of unused permits was allowed 
between the pilot phase and subsequent EU ETS phases. The first 
commitment period (2008-2012), that was even the period leading to the 
Kyoto commitment period (2012), extended the scope of the scheme to 
aviation (2012) and increased the penalty for non-compliant plants to 100 
euros per ton. Finally, the second commitment period (2013-2020) 
 
2 Emended by the Directives 2004/101/EC and 2008/101/EC, the Regulation 219/2009 
and the Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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introduced a single cap valid for all the EU for total emissions and a rising 
use of auctioning in the allocation of permits, with some exception for 
selected sectors. 
The EU ETS covers, now, all EU28 countries plus Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. As it is characterised by substantial sunk and fixed costs 
(including administrative and monitoring costs for participants and 
governments), the Commission decided to include in the scheme only the 
biggest emitters of CO2. These emitters are identified by their sector of 
operation (or type of activity) and by the size of the plant in terms of 
production capacity. The scheme currently covers about 11,000 plants in 
Europe that contribute to around 45 percent of overall European 
greenhouse gases emissions.3 The sectors and thresholds involved in the 
ETS scheme are reported in Annex I of the Directive and have been 
emended twice since 2003. 
However, some exemptions were awarded in order to reduce the 
possible carbon leakage effect, that is the phenomenon for which firms may 
relocate part of the production in countries where this kind of regulation is 
not in place: this effect may hinder the policy effectiveness of the 
regulation. In this light, a major amendment to the Directive concerned the 
differentiation of the allocation scheme across sectors for the second EU 
ETS commitment period (2013-2020) according to the criteria described in 
the new articles 10 bis and 10 ter (Directive 2009/29/EC). The Decision of 
the European Commission 2010/2/EU ‘Determining, pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of 
sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk 
of carbon leakage’ provided a list of 4-digit NACE sectors for which 
permits could be grandfathered rather than auctioned also in the second 
commitment period due to potentially relevant risks of off-shoring of these 
production activities deriving from the EU ETS. These sectors were 
identified through qualitative and quantitative analysis on the importance of 
potential carbon leakage and, to some extent, through a political 
negotiation. Three main criteria were included in the amendment to identify 
the list of sectors to be exempted from auctioning:4 
• The first is a ‘trade-based’ criterion according to which industries (4-
digit NACE) having a non-EU trade intensity (import plus export over 
 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm 
4 A fourth criterion refer to qualitative assessment (Art. 10bis.17) of the likely impact of 
EU ETS on production costs, investments and profit margins. 
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domestic production) greater than 30% are exempted from auctioning 
(trade criterion); 
• The second refers to those industries (4-digit NACE) that are expected 
to experience additional (either direct and indirect) costs as a 
consequence of the implementation of the ETS Directive greater than 
30% of their gross value added (emission criterion); 
• The last criterion concerns industries (4-digit NACE) having, at the 
same time, moderate trade intensity and implementation costs (trade 
intensity greater than 10% and costs greater than 5% of gross value 
added.5 
The list was subsequently further emended to add other sectors with the 
decisions of the European Commission 2012/498/EU (that added sector 
2614 ‘Manufacture of glass fibres’) and 2014/9/EU (that added sector 2653 
‘Manufacture of plaster’ and sector 2662 ‘Manufacture of plaster products 
for construction purposes’). However, the practice of exempting specific 
sectors from existing regulations is not uncommon: as Martin et al. (2015) 
recall, since the introduction of carbon taxes back in the ‘90s, most of the 
countries involved grant some sort of exemptions to energy intensive firms 
to avoid their relocation. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
As a free allocation scheme can potentially have distorting effects on the 
effectiveness and the working of an emissions cap-and-trade system, this 
issue has increasingly attracted interest from research and policy 
communities. This is because the absence of distortionary effects of free 
allocations can be seen as a necessary condition for the cost-effectiveness 
of a cap-and-trade scheme. Whether such distortions occur or not is, 
obviously, of particular interest, especially for those cap-and-trade schemes 
in which a large portion (or even the most) of the total allowance allocation 
occurs practically free of charge: installations receive a free an annual 
endowment of permits, usually based on the installation’s history in terms 
of verified emissions. If we were in an idealized world, allocations and 
emissions had to be totally independent: in this way, any arbitrary 
distributions of property rights would not affect outcomes, either on the 
 
5 These criteria are thoroughly discussed in the following document: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/documentation_en.htm 
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trading side and on the emissions side (Coase, 1960). The occurrence of 
this independence property in actual cap-and-trade schemes would be a 
very important finding as this leave to policy-makers the freedom to use 
free allocation of allowances in a political way, letting the cap-and-trade 
system do not suffer any negative consequence, especially in terms of cost 
effectiveness (Hahn and Stavins, 2011). However, in a real-world cap-and-
trade system, there are a lot of reasons for which a free allocation of 
permits could distort and affect emissions outcomes, for example the 
presence of transaction costs (Coase, 1960; Stavins, 1995) or behavioural 
anomalies (Kahneman et al., 1991). So, ensuring in a rigorous way if 
different allocation mechanisms affect emission outcomes becomes of 
major relevance. 
The insight that, in the absence of any significant friction, optimal 
emissions at the installation level are invariant with respect to the initial 
allocation of property rights dates back to Coase (1960). Hahn and Stavins 
(2011) defined this invariance as the independence property in cap-and-
trade systems. It has been shown that this independence (or invariance) 
property holds in a frictionless cap-and-trade system, as long as allocation 
occurs in a lump-sum fashion (Montgomery, 1972). However, as we said 
before, there is a number of reasons why this independence property could 
fail in a real-world cap-and-trade scheme, when installations receive some 
endowments of allowance allocations free of charge, even when the 
allocation is a lump-sum one. Transaction costs (Stavins, 1995) or 
imperfect competition (Hahn, 1984) can lead to some kind of distortions in 
installation-level emission and abatement outcomes. This independence 
property can fail also due to some behavioural anomalies. It has been 
shown in the behavioural economics literature that in experimental settings 
subjects value their allowance in a different way, depending on their 
allocation status, leading to under-trading and a loss in cost-effectiveness in 
the cap-and-trade system (Kahneman et al, 1990; Murphy and Stranlund, 
2007). 
However, using empirical analysis, it is still challenging to evaluate in a 
rigorous way whether there exists a causal relationship between 
installation-level allocation and emissions. The main difficulty is due to the 
endogeneity of allocations, which are typically correlated to historical 
plant-level emissions. Therefore, in order to identify an actual causal effect 
of allocation on emissions, we require an exogenous source of variation in 
allocation. This is the major reason why the empirical literature focusing on 
the causal relationship between emissions and initial allocations in cap-and-
trade systems is very poor, consisting of only two papers. Fowlie and 
Perloff (2013) investigate this question, using the context of California’s 
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RECLAIM program6 and using an instrumental variable approach to 
identification. Reguant and Ellerman (2008), instead, investigate the same 
question for Spanish thermal power plants regulated under the EU ETS 
during ETS Phase I (2005-2008) and exploit a non-linearity in the national 
allocation rule for identification. Both of these papers did not find a 
significant endowment effect. 
Which are the reasons that motivate a free allocation system in a cap-
and-trade scheme? When a government intervenes in a marketplace, this 
intervention is always intended as a mean to increase net social welfare. 
Increasing social welfare by regulation could impose a cost on some 
industries for being compliant to the new regulation and then a government 
could use part of the revenues to partially compensate industries. This 
distributional effect of the new regulation could have, in principle, 
consequences on the policy design. Let us suppose industries are offered no 
compensation at all, then the same industries have strong incentives to 
spend money on supporting political parties that are against the regulation, 
or to push to have exemption clauses, that could weaken the policy’s 
effectiveness. Even worse, new regulation could push industries to relocate 
to unregulated countries, and this is a threat for politicians, as job losses 
could affect re-election probability. 
When we are dealing with policies about climate change (that is a global 
externality), this threat about relocation is even worse because of the so-
called ‘carbon leakage’. The relocation of industrial production does not 
only shift jobs to other countries, but also relocates GHG emissions: in this 
way, the policy does not only cause job losses in the country (or countries, 
in case of trans-national regulation) but does not reach the goal in 
environmental terms. The threat of relocation within the EU ETS gave rise 
to the three exemption criteria that were discussed in section 2. 
 
6 REgional CLean Air Incentives Market is an emission trading program operating in the 
state of California since 1994. This program was imposed by SCAQMD (South Coast Air 
Quality Management District) in order to replace a series of more than 40 prescriptive rules, 
which had been opposed by the industry. The main goal of the program was to make so that 
hundreds of polluting facilities cut their emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and Sulphur 
Oxides (SOx). At its inception, in 1994, RECLAIM included 392 facilities whose combined 
NOx emissions accounted for over 65% of the region's stationary NOx emissions. Almost 
all facilities in SCAQMD with annual NOx or SOx emissions of four tons or more were 
included in the program. A RECLAIM trading credit (RTC) confers the right to emit one 
pound of emissions in a twelve-month period. At the outset of the program, facilities were 
informed of how many permits they would be allocated for free each year through 2010. 
NOx emissions permitted under RECLAIM were reduce by over the 70 percent over the first 
ten years of the program. 
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Nonetheless, the importance of carbon leakage in climate policy design, 
there is little empirical evidence about the link the defined EU criteria and a 
sector’s vulnerability to carbon leakage. All the existing studies are ex-post 
ones and they find no evidence of possible strong adverse impacts of the 
new regulation on competitiveness indicators, in case allocations are given 
for free: see, for example, Anger and Oberndorfer (2008); Abrell et al., 
(2011); Bushnell et al. (2013); Chan et al. (2013); Commins et al. (2011); 
Petrick and Wagner (2014); Wagner et al. (2013); Borghesi et al. (2018). 
Instead, if we move to theoretical and simulation-based studies, we find a 
negative impact of the new cap-and-trade scheme on production in most 
manufacturing industries: see, for example, Reinaud (2005); Demailly and 
Quirion (2006, 2008); McKinsey and Ecofys (2006a, 2006b). They also 
show that the free allowances allocation compensates negative profit 
impacts in most industries and can even lead to overcompensation, as 
shown in Smale et al. (2006). 
 
 
3. Trends in emissions within the EU ETS 
 
In this section, we analyse the behaviour of emission distribution, either 
considering our whole data-set and splitting it in different subsets. We 
employ data at the establishment level available from the European Union 
Registry for the period 2008-2014.7 
As a first step, we plot the rank-size distribution, reported in Figure 1. 
The figure is built in the following way: we sort all the plants in our dataset 
in a descending order on the basis of their verified emissions and we rank 
them from 1 to n, then we plot the logarithm of emissions and the logarithm 
of rank. The distribution has essentially the same shape for the first and last 
year of our series (2008 and 2014, respectively). What is worth noticing is 
that the distribution in 2014, with few exceptions, lies below the 
distribution for 2008 (only the highest ranks behave in the opposite way, 
having an amount of verified emissions that is greater with respect to the 
2008) signalling that, in those 6 years, emissions have been lowered.  
 
  
 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry/documentation_en.htm 
 
 
30 
Fig. 1 - Log Emissions vs Log Rank 
 
 
In Figure 2 we reported, for each plant for which we have data both in 
2008 and in 2014, the plant’s verified emission growth rate (computed as 
logarithmic return: log(emissions(2014)/emissions(2008))) against the logarithm 
of the initial emission size (verified emissions in 2008). The plot suggests 
that there has been a decrease in the growth rate as the emissions’ size 
increase, i.e. the smallest plants have a higher growth rate with respect to 
the biggest ones. As there is large variance in the growth rate in verified 
emissions across plants, we decide to split the sample in smaller quantiles 
of verified emissions and take the mean logarithmic growth rate within 
each quantile. This plot is much clearer than the first one, confirming our 
first impression of growth rate decreasing as a function of initial emissions’ 
size. Moreover, as we found a very regular behaviour, we tried to fit it, 
obtaining a very good fit with a power law distribution (R squared equal to 
0.63, not reported), as we show in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 2 - Log Growth Rate vs Log (Emissions) 
 
 
The decreasing relationship seems to be quite glaring: whereas the 
largest emitters decreased (on average) their amount of emissions, the 
smallest emitters, on average, increased a lot their amount of emissions. 
This result seems to go against the evidence discussed for Figure 3. 
However, this is not the case because, as we said before, in Figure 3 we do 
not have any hint about which plant was in the highest ranks in 2008 and 
which in 2014 whereas in Figure 4 on the x-axis the ranking in 2008 is, in a 
way, considered and we can observe how it changed throughout those 6 
years. Moreover, whereas in Figure 3 there is a complete representation of 
all our data, in Figure 4 each point represents an average of plants that fall 
in the same bin. 
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Fig. 3 - Log Growth Rate vs Log (Emissions) 
 
 
So far, we considered the longest period for which we have data (from 
2008 to 2014). However, as discussed in the previous sections, during this 
period, the regulation moved from the second phase (2008-2012) to the 
third phase (from 2013 onwards), in which emissions were not any more 
freely allocated (grandfathering) but increasingly auctioned, with the 
exclusion of leakage-exposed sectors. As discussed in the theoretical part, 
this change in the regulation should not have effect on the polluting 
behaviour of the plants as at the margin the opportunity cost of emitting or 
abating should remain the same. As a first step to evaluate this hypothesis, 
we look at the logarithmic growth rate of emissions as a function of the 
ratio between verified and allocated emissions: this could represent a 
measure of how much impact could have the change of normative on 
plants’ emissions (Figure 4). 
The figure is realized in the following way. On the y-axis, as we did 
before, we report the logarithmic growth rate of emissions, whereas, on the 
x-axis, we report the ratio between verified and allocated emissions. Each 
point in the plot represent the mean logarithmic growth rate and the mean 
ratio of verified and allocated emissions of several plants falling in the 
same bin. 
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Fig. 4 - Logarithmic emissions’ growth rate as a function of the ratio between verified and 
allocated emissions 
2008-2012 
          
2013-2014 
 
On the left, we find the plot for the period 2008-2012 whereas, on the right, we can find the 
plot for the period 2013-2014. The red line is a zero-level line in order to distinguish plants 
who increased their emissions from plants who decreased their emissions. 
 
In this way, we can distinguish different behaviours for plants who 
needed to buy allowances on the market to cover their verified emissions 
(that is, the average verified-to-allocated emission ratio is greater than one) 
and plants who could sell allowances on the market because they were 
endowed with more than needed (verified-to-allocated emission ratio below 
one). As we can see from the figure, there was a huge change in the 
polluting behaviour from the first period (2008-2012, first ETS and Kyoto 
commitment period) to the second period (2013-2014). The difference is 
particularly big for plants whose ratio between verified and allocated 
emissions is greater than 1. 
Lastly, we wanted to check if this different polluting behaviour is 
different between exempted and not exempted sectors, in order to see 
whether the above-mentioned exemption from auctioning could have had 
an impact on the behaviour in the two periods. To do so, we repeat the plot 
of Figure 4 splitting our sample in two, one for plants in sectors that were 
exempted (Esentati) and one for plants in sectors that were not exempted 
(No Esentati). Results are reported in Figure 5. 
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Fig. 5 - Logarithmic emissions’ growth rate as a function of the ratio between verified and 
allocated emissions 
2008-2012 
           
2013-2014 
 
On the left, we find the plot for the period 2008-2012 whereas, on the right, we can find the 
plot for the period 2013-2014. In red, we find plants in exempted sectors whereas, in blue, 
we find plants in not exempted sectors. 
 
There does not seem to be a systematic difference in emission growth in 
the two periods between exempted and non-exempted plants for different 
levels of the average verified-to-allocated ratio. When looking at trends in 
verified and allocated emissions (Figure 6) we observe that, even before the 
exemption, the amount of permit allocated to sectors more exposed to trade 
systematically exceeded the amount of verified emissions while the 
opposite occurred for sectors not exposed to leakage. This fact is a signal 
that even before the change in regulation sectors exposed to leakage were 
either over-endowed of permits or they were over-abating with respect to 
other sectors. As expected, the number of allocated permits dropped 
substantially (almost to zero) for establishments in non-exempted sectors 
from 2013 onwards, while the drop was much smaller for establishments in 
exempted sectors. Interestingly, in 2013 (first year after the reform) verified 
emissions of sector exempted from auctioning increased substantially while 
verified emissions of other sectors (that had to buy permits) experienced a 
moderate growth. This is a first indication that the initial endowment of 
permits matters for the distribution of pollution abatement. 
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Fig. 6 - Trend in verified and allocated emissions for exempted and non-exempted plants 
 
 
 
4. Regression analysis 
 
The detailed descriptive evidence highlighted so far suggests that plants 
in those sectors that were forced to purchase pollution permits through 
auctions from 2013 onwards reduced their emissions relatively more than 
plants in sectors exempted from auction. This may suggest that the 
allocation mechanism chosen by the regulator is not neutral in terms of 
abatement choice of firms and that the coexistence of different allocation 
mechanisms within the same cap-and-trade scheme may generate 
distortions. To better identify whether this descriptive evidence is not the 
result of other factors that influence emissions and abatement choice we 
employ a state of the art econometric approach to evaluate whether this 
change in regulation influenced abatement choices. 
A recent paper by Zaklan (2016) evaluates the impact of the same 
change in the allocation mechanism of the EU-ETS only for plants that 
operate in the power sector. Their identification is based on the fact that for 
8 EU countries (with a GDP per capita below 60% of the EU average) 
obtained from the Commission a postponement of the allocation through 
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auction for plants in the power sector up to year 2020 to ease the 
modernization of the power sector. Exploiting this asymmetry in 
regulation, the authors find little support for significant impacts of 
heterogeneous allocation mechanisms on verified emissions in the power 
sector. 
It should be noted, however, that the features of the power sector (i.e. 
large firms, non-tradability of the output and inelastic demand for 
electricity) are likely to attenuate the expected impact of changes in 
allocation mechanisms on abatement behaviour. Companies in the power 
sector can easily pass-through increases in production costs to consumers, 
creating little incentives, at least in the short term, to change their 
abatement behaviour. On the contrary, plants in tradable industries such as 
manufacturing industries, exposed to international competition, have much 
smaller possibility to pass through higher upfront costs for complying with 
the regulation and may decide to change their abatement behaviour even in 
the shorter run. For this reason, our focus from now onwards is on the 
manufacturing industry only. 
To evaluate how the distribution of pollution abatement changed after 
the reform of the EU-ETS that exempts plants in specific sector from 
auctioning we estimate a simple econometric model. The idea is that in 
absence of exemption, verified emissions and allocation of permits would 
have evolved in the same way for both treated and control plants. As we 
expect that plants belonging to section exempted from auctioning differ 
systematically in pre-treatment features from other ETS plants, we identify 
a suitable counterfactual by means of a propensity score matching 
approach. We thus estimate the following equation on the sample that 
contains treated and matched (based on propensity score) control plants: 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑_𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/0) = 𝛽	𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛9 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡20130 +	𝑋B𝛾 + +𝜏0 + 𝛼/ + 𝜀/0 
 
where 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑_𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/0 represents verified emissions for 
establishment i in year t, 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛9 is a dummy variable (time-invariant) 
that equals one for those sectors that are not exempted from auctioning 
from 2013 onwards, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡20130  equals one for years 2013 and 2014 and 
zero otherwise, 𝑋B is a vector of control variables (EU28-level trends in 
production by 4-digit NACE sector in log from PRODCOM, country-
specific dummies and sector specific - 2 digit NACE - dummies), 𝜏0 are 
time dummies and 𝛼/ is the plant fixed effect. 
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Our parameter of interest is 𝛽 which describes the estimated decrease in 
verified emissions in establishments that are required to purchase permits 
with auctions from 2013 onwards. This is a simple difference-in-difference 
approach. The identification assumption is that treated and untreated 
individuals would have followed the same trend in absence of the 
treatment. As the assignment to treatment is not random (i.e. it is based on 
the sector of operation of the plant), there are many possible reasons that 
may give rise to different trends in emissions even in absence of the 
treatment. We already partly account for these confounding factors with the 
inclusion of the establishment fixed effect (that account for time-invariant 
differences across plants), the sectoral trend in production (that account for 
the dynamics of demand), country-specific trends and activity-specific 
trends. This may not be enough as other systematic differences between 
plants in different sectors may give rise to different trends. For this reason, 
we try to further reduce the heterogeneity between treated and control 
plants by matching controls to treated by means of the propensity score. We 
estimate the probability of belonging to non-exempted sectors as a function 
of trends in production for the 4-digit NACE sector over 2005-2009 (to 
account for possible difference in output growth), average ratio between 
verified and allocated emissions in 2008-2009 for the 4-digit NACE sector 
to account for pre-treatment systematic over- or under-endowment in the 
sector, the log of verified emissions in the plant for 2008 to account for 
differences in the size of plants and country dummies. As a baseline, we 
employ kernel matching to exploit as much information as possible about 
controls in a flexible way. In this way, in fact, the counterfactual is a 
weighted average of different controls, with weights being specific for each 
treated and inversely proportional to the distance in terms of estimated 
propensity score.8 
Results of the propensity score estimate and of the balancing (before 
and after matching) are reported in Table 1. The propensity score is 
successful in reducing the heterogeneity in terms of all the variables we 
included in the propensity score estimation. 
Figure 7 reports the distribution of the estimated propensity score for 
treated, all controls and matched controls. The density function for treated 
and controls is very similar, suggesting that the two groups are rather 
 
8 As a robustness check we also repeat our analysis with one nearest neighbour matching 
with caliper (0.05) to reduce the possible bias of using very heterogeneous controls in the 
kernel approach. 
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homogeneous after matching. The dark grey dot, however, describes a plant that 
was not matched due to absence of common support in the propensity score. 
 
Tab. 1 - Propensity score and balancing 
Propensity score Pr(Auction=1) 
Average 
treated 
Average 
controls 
(all) 
t-test on 
the 
difference 
Average 
matched 
controls 
t-test on 
the 
difference 
Growth in production (4-digit 
NACE)  
-
0.0103** 1.415 2.5239 -4.02*** 1.2391 0.450 
for 2005-2009 (0.0061) 
     Average verified/allocated 
emissions  1.760*** 0.7781 0.75477 2.58** 0.76895 1.30 
(4-digit NACE) for 2008-2009 (0.2666) 
     log(verified emissions of the 
plant, 2008) 0.241*** -0.4296 -3.413 
-
11.32*** -4.2739 0.851 
 
(0.0211)           
N 2867 
      
Fig. 7 - Distribution of estimated propensity score 
 
 
Average treatment effect on the treated, where the outcome variable is 
the growth in emissions for the years 2009 to 2014 with respect to 
emissions in 2008, are reported in Table 2. These are simple difference-in-
differences estimates, with no additional control variable. We observe that 
the estimated difference in growth rates in verified emissions between 
0
1
2
3
4
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
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treated and controls is small and insignificant until 2012 and becomes large 
and significant from 2013 onwards, that is the year in which we observe the 
change in regulation. Overall, the estimated difference is around 12 log 
points in 2013 and reaches 14.6 log points in 2014, pointing to a large 
estimated effect. The negative sign means that those plants that continued 
to receive their allowances for free have increased their emissions with 
respect to the ones that had to purchase them in auction, leading to non-
neutrality of abatement choices with respect to allocation mechanisms. 
 
Tab. 2 - Average treatment effect (simple difference in differences on matched plants) 
Treatment effect   Difference  SE t-test 
Change in log verified  Unmatched 0.0425 (0.0220) 1.94* 
emissions 2008-2009 ATT 0.0284 (0.0253) 1.13 
Change in log verified  Unmatched 0.0111 (0.0241) 0.46 
emissions 2008-2010 ATT -0.0014 (0.0275) -0.05 
Change in log verified  Unmatched -0.0098 (0.0309) -0.32 
emissions 2008-2011 ATT -0.0256 (0.0345) -0.74 
Change in log verified  Unmatched 0.0225 (0.0331) 0.68 
emissions 2008-2012 ATT -0.0096 (0.0359) -0.27 
Change in log verified  Unmatched -0.0425 (0.0424) -1.00 
emissions 2008-2013 ATT -0.1203 (0.0415) -2.90*** 
Change in log verified  Unmatched -0.0674 (0.0483) -1.40 
emissions 2008-2014 ATT -0.1457 (0.0499) -2.92*** 
 
Tab. 3 - Difference-in-differences with kernel matching and controls 
log(verified emissions) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exempted x anticipation (2010-
2012) -0.0133 -0.0264 -0.0209 -0.0276 -0.0227 -0.0293    
 
(0.0211) (0.0234) (0.0232) (0.0271) (0.0229) (0.0273)    
Exempted x post 2013 
-
0.0762** 
-
0.147*** 
-
0.162*** 
-
0.205*** 
-
0.163*** 
-
0.205*** 
 
(0.0353) (0.0384) (0.0382) (0.0500) (0.0373) (0.0491)    
log(Production, NACE 4-digit) 
  
0.510*** 0.0540 0.523*** 0.0931    
      (0.0804) (0.114) (0.0835) (0.110)    
Matched on PS No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector (NACE 2 digit) year 
dummies No No No Yes No Yes 
Country-year dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
N 20125 20055 20055 20055 20055 20055    
Fixed effects model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Only 
establishments observed all years over the period 2008-2014 are included. 
 
Our baseline estimates (that also account for a series of control 
variables) are reported in Table 3. Column 1 reports estimates for the full 
sample with no matching of treated with similar controls while in the other 
columns we weight plants according to the weights estimated in the 
matching phase. Column 6 is our favourite estimate, in which we match 
treated with similar control and add the full set of control variables. The 
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treatment effect is negative, significant and around 20.5 log points. We also 
account for possible anticipation effects as the exemption was already 
agreed upon in December 2009. Overall, there is no evidence of 
anticipation which turns out to be insignificant in all estimates. Results 
appear to be very similar (though smaller in magnitude) when using the one 
nearest neighbour matching algorithm (Table 4). Finally, when looking at 
the time profile of the estimated effect in a more flexible way (Table 5) we 
observe that no effect is found before 2013 while the effect is large and 
robust afterwards, especially so in 2014. 
 
Tab. 4 - Difference-in-differences with 1 nearest neighbour matching and controls  
log(verified emissions) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exempted x anticipation (2010-
2012) -0.0133 0.00123 0.00802 0.00490 
-
0.000877 -0.00994 
 
(0.0211) (0.0355) (0.0347) (0.0418) (0.0337) (0.0442) 
Exempted x post 2013 
-
0.0762** -0.111** -0.120** -0.120** 
-
0.127*** -0.140** 
 
(0.0353) (0.0475) (0.0478) (0.0603) (0.0481) (0.0640) 
log(Production, NACE 4-digit)   0.450*** 0.0540 0.448*** 0.0679     (0.126) (0.153) (0.122) (0.150) Matched on PS No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector (NACE 2 digit) year 
dummies No No No Yes No Yes 
Country-year dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
N 20125 6468 6468 6468 6468 6468 
Fixed effects model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Only 
establishments observed all years over the period 2008-2014 are included. 
 
Tab. 5 - Time profile of the effect 
log(verified emissions) 
 
(1) (2) 
Exempted x D2009 -0.0281 -0.0491    
 
(0.0312) (0.0472)    
Exempted x D2010 -0.0355 -0.0275    
 
(0.0313) (0.0485)    
Exempted x D2011 -0.0327 -0.0262    
 
(0.0370) (0.0623)    
Exempted x D2012 -0.0612 -0.0472    
 
(0.0487) (0.0740)    
Exempted x D2013 -0.202*** -0.122    
 
(0.0529) (0.0775)    
Exempted x D2014 -0.234*** -0.205*** 
 
(0.0583) (0.0763)    
log(Production, NACE 4-digit) 0.103 0.0939    
  (0.115) (0.153)    
Matching Kernel One NN 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Sector (NACE 2 digit) year dummies Yes Yes 
Country-year dummies Yes Yes 
N 20125 19810 
Fixed effects model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Only 
establishments observed all years over the period 2008-2014 are included. 
 
 
41 
Concluding remarks 
 
The paper proposes an empirical evaluation of the neutrality (or absence 
thereof) of the allocation mechanism for abatement decisions within cap-
and-trade schemes. Our analysis is based on data on emissions of the 
European ETS. This scheme, the largest in the world in terms of amount of 
emissions and number of involved establishments, is particularly suitable to 
test the neutrality of allocation mechanisms as it experienced a change in 
the allocation mechanism in recent years. The move from grandfathering to 
partial (i.e. with exemption) auctioning allows to estimate whether the way 
permits are allocated has an influence on abatement decisions, against the 
prediction of the Coase theorem. 
After providing a comprehensive descriptive evidence on recent trends 
in verified emissions and allocation of permits, we evaluate whether the 
change in regulation, with an exemption from auctioning granted to 
leakage-exposed sectors, influenced abatement behaviours of firms. 
Focusing on manufacturing establishment, our preferred estimate suggests 
an increase in emission of about 20.5 log points for plants that are 
exempted from auctioning with respect to the ones that should buy permits 
through auctions. This contradicts the theoretical prediction about the 
neutrality of allocation mechanisms in cap-and-trade schemes, thus leading 
to sub-optimal outcomes. These findings should inform policy makers 
about possible ways of improving ETS-like schemes in order to improve 
their economic efficiency and correct for potential distortions induced by 
specific rules for specific case such as the case of carbon leakage. 
Even though these findings already represent a useful contribution for 
the policy debate, further research is needed to understand which are the 
more important mechanisms that induce changes in abatement choices as a 
consequence of changes in allocation mechanism. This additional research 
should consider both theoretical reasoning about the non-neutrality and 
empirical validation of these theoretical hypothesis. 
 
 
References 
 
Abrell, J., Ndoye, A., and Zachmann, G. (2011). Assessing the impact of the EU ETS using 
firm level data. Bruegel Working Paper 2011/08, Brussels, Belgium. 
Anger, N., and Oberndorfer, U. (2008). Firm performance and employment in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme: An empirical assessment for Germany. Energy Policy, 
36(1): 12–22. 
 
 
42 
Borghesi, S., Montini, M., and Barreca, A. (2016). The European Emission Trading System 
and Its Followers. Comparative Analysis and Linking Perspectives. SpringerBriefs in 
Environmental Science, Springer. 
Borghesi, S., Franco, C., and Marin, G. (2018). Outward Foreign Direct Investments 
Patterns of Italian Firms in the EU ETS. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
forthcoming 
Bushnell, J. B., Chong, H., and Mansur, E. T. (2011). Profiting from Regulation: An Event 
Study of the European Carbon Market. Dartmouth College Working Paper, Hanover, 
NH. 
Calel, R., and Dechezlepretre, A. (2016). Environmental policy and directed technological 
change: Evidence from European carbon market. Review of Economics and Statistics, 
98(1): 173–191. 
Chan, H. S., Li, S., and Zhang, F. (2013). Firm competitiveness and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Energy Policy, 63: 1056-1064 
Commins, N., Lyons, S., Schiffbauer, M., and Tol, N. C. (2011). Climate Policy and 
Corporate Behavior. The Energy Journal, 32(4) 
Coase, R.H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Social Economics, 3: 1-44 
Demailly, D., and Quirion, P. (2006). CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the 
European cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering versus output-based 
allocation. Climate Policy, 1: 93–113. 
Demailly, D., and Quirion, P. (2008). European Emission Trading Scheme and 
competitiveness: A case study on the iron and steel industry. Energy Economics, 30(4): 
2009–2027. 
Fowlie, M., and Perhoff, J. M. (2013). Distributing pollution rights in cap-and-trade 
programs: are outcomes independent of allocations? Review of Economics and Statistics, 
95: 1640-1652. 
Frankel, J. A., and Rose A. K. (2005). Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting 
Out the Causality. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(1): 85-91. 
Greenstone, M. (2002). The Impact of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: 
Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of 
Manufactures. Journal of Political Economy, 110(6): 1175-1219. 
Hahn, R. W. (1984), Market Power and Transferable Property Rights. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 99: 753-765. 
Hahn, R. W., and Stavins R. N. (2011). The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-
Trade System Performance. Journal of Law and Economics, 54: 267-294. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch J. L., and Thaler R. H. (1990). Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6): 1325-
1348. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, 
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5: 193-206 
Levinson, A. (1996). Environmental Regulations and Manufacturers’ Location Choices: 
Evidence from the Census of Manufactures. Journal of Public Economics, 62: 5-29. 
Marin, G., Marino, M., and Pellegrin, C. (2017) The impact of the European Emission 
Trading Scheme on multiple measures of economic performance. Environmental and 
Resource Economics, online first. 
Martin, R., Muuls, M., de Preux, L. B., and Wagner, U. J. (2014). Industry compensation 
under relocation risk: A firm-level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
American Economic Review, 104(8): 2482-2508. 
 
 
43 
Martin, R., Muuls, M., and Wagner, U. J. (2015). The Impact of the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme on Regulated Firms: What Is the Evidence after Ten Years? 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 10 (1): 129-148. 
McKinsey, and Ecofys (2006a). EU ETS REVIEW Report on International 
Competitiveness. European Commission Directorate General for Environment, Brussels. 
McKinsey, and Ecofys (2006b). Review of Emissions Trading Scheme: Survey highlights. 
European Commission Directorate General for Environment, Brussels. 
Montgomery, W. D. (1972). Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs. 
Journal of Economic Theory, 5: 395-418. 
Murphy, J. J., and Stranlund J. K. (2007). A Laboratory Investigation of Compliance 
Behavior under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications for Targeted Enforcement. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 53: 196-212. 
Palmer, K., Oates W. E., and Portney P. R. (1995). Tightening Environmental Standards: 
The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4): 
119-132. 
Petrick, S., and Wagner U. J. (2014). The Impact of Carbon Trading on Industry: Evidence 
from German Manufacturing Firms. Kiel Working Paper, 1912. 
Porter, M. E., and van der Linde C. (1995). Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4): 119-132. 
Reguant, M., and Ellerman, D. (2008). Grandfathering and the Endowment Effect: An 
Assessment in the Context of the Spanish National Allocation Plan. MIT CEEPR 
Working Paper, 08-018. 
Reinaud, J. (2005). Industrial competitiveness Trading Scheme. IEA Information Paper, 
International Energy Agency, Paris, France. 
Smale, R., Hartley, M., Hepburn, C. J.,Ward, J., and Grubb, M. (2006). The impact of CO2 
emissions trading on firm profits and market prices. Climate Policy, 6(1): 31–48. 
Stavins, R. N. (1995). Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 29: 133-148. 
Wagner, U. J., Muuls M., Martin R., and Colmer, J. (2013). The causal effect of the 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme: Evidence from French manufacturing 
plants. mimeo. 
Zaklan, A. (2016). Free allocation and the endowment effect in cap-and-trade systems: 
evidence from the European electricity sector. EAERE Conference 2016, Zurich.  
 
 
44 
Appendix - 4-digit sectors’ classification criteria 
 
The criteria according to which a sector is believed to be exposed to high 
carbon leakage risk are the following: 
A. Criterion explained at article 10 bis, paragraph 15, directive 2003/87/EC; 
at least middle trade and emissions 
B. Criterion explained at article 10 bis, paragraph 16, a) letter, directive 
2003/87/EC; high emissions 
C. Criterion explained at article 10 bis, paragraph 16, b) letter, directive 
2003/87/EC; high trade 
Paragraph 15 A sector or a sub-sector is believed to be exposed to high carbon 
emissions relocation risk if: 
a) the sum of extra costs (either direct or indirect) caused by the compliance 
to this directive could lead to a considerable increase in production costs, 
computed as a percentage of the gross value added, of at least 5%; and 
b) the intensity of exchange with third countries, intended as the ratio 
between the sum of the exportation value towards third countries and the 
importation value from those countries and the overall market volume for 
European Community (annual business volume plus total importations 
from those countries) is greater than 10%. 
Paragraph 16 Furthermore, a sector or a sub-sector is believed to be exposed 
to high carbon emissions relocation risk if: 
a) the sum of extra costs (either direct or indirect) caused by the compliance 
to this directive could lead to a very considerable increase in production 
costs, computed as a percentage of the gross value added, of at least 30%; 
or 
b) the intensity of exchange with third countries, intended as the ratio 
between the sum of the exportation value towards third countries and the 
importation value from those countries and the overall market volume for 
European Community (annual business volume plus total importations 
from those countries) is greater than 30%. 
Paragraph 17 The list at paragraph 13 can be integrated after a qualitative 
valuation has been completed, taking into account, should be available applicable 
data, the following criteria: 
a) the measure in which each plant of the interested sector or subsector is 
able to reduce emission level or electric energy consumption, taking into 
account, in case, the possible increase of production costs deriving from 
corresponding investment, for example, applying most efficient 
techniques; 
b) the present and foreseen market characteristics, even when commercial 
exposition or costs growth rate (either direct or indirect) are close to the 
maximum, explained at paragraph 16 
c) profit margins, as potential indicators for investment decisions, either 
long-term or transfer. 
